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ABSTRACT 
 
It is difficult for females to climb the corporate ladder to the CEO position. Most of the previous 
research examines the obstacles that prevent females from reaching top management positions 
and ultimately the top position of CEO. In this study we examine this issue from the opposite side, 
i.e., we examine CEO successions were the outgoing CEO is female and the incoming CEO is 
male. We distinguish between outgoing female CEO successors who have prior CEO experience 
and those who do not have prior CEO experience. We find that prior CEO experience is positively 
related to the outgoing female CEO total compensation in the year preceding the succession, 
positively related to firm performance and negatively related to the probability of firm bankruptcy 
in the three years preceding the succession. Prior CEO experience is also positively related to the 
percentage of female and ethnic minority directors on the board in the two years preceding the 
succession.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
annie Hurst, an American novelist who passed away in 1968, once said, “A woman has to be twice as 
good as a man to go half as far.” This appears to be the case today when it comes to females in CEO 
positions. In 2013, women accounted for about 4% of CEOs in Fortune 500 companies, according to 
advocacy group Catalyst
1
. In 2012, there were only 18 female CEOs of Fortune 500 companies (Aguilar, 2013). 
This was an increase from the 8 female CEOs of Fortune 500 companies in 2005 (Catalyst, 2006). However, when 
females do get a chance to serve in leadership positions (Ryan and Haslam, 2007; 2005) they are faced with the 
“glass cliff” phenomenon2. The “glass cliff” phenomenon states that females are overrepresented in precarious 
leadership positions (Ryan and Haslam, 2009; 2005). Haslam and Ryan (2008) go as far as stating that “women are 
selected for leadership positions ahead of similarly qualified men when (and only when) there is a high risk of 
organizational failure.” 
 
Female CEOs 
 
 There are several explanations for the low numbers of female CEOs and females in top management 
positions in general. One of the reasons is the exit of highly capable females from the male-dominated corporate 
world in order to start their own businesses (Oakley, 2000). In 1992, there were 6.5 million female-owned 
businesses that employed more individuals than all the Fortune 500 firms combined (Rosener, 1995). From 1975 to 
1990, female entrepreneurs in the U.S. started businesses at a rate that was more than twice as much as their male 
counterparts (Moore and Buttner, 1997). 
 
                                                 
1 Catalyst is a research organization specializing in female’s career advancement. 
2 The “glass cliff” phenomenon has been challenged by Adams, Gupta and Leeth (2009). 
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 Another possible reason for the low number of female CEOs is that females at the CEO position advocate 
for change from the status quo. This is a threat to the “old boy network” which is defined by Oakley (2000) as “an 
informal male social system that stretches within and across organizations, and excludes less powerful males and 
all women from membership.” It has been established that female CEOs and females in top management positions in 
general are paid less than their male counterparts (Kulich et al., 2011; Blau and Khan, 2000; Roos and Gatta, 1999; 
Gordon, 1992). As a result, allowing large numbers of females to advance to CEO positions can be seen as a threat 
to the ever increasing compensation packages and perks that most CEOs currently enjoy and that have been 
criticized by the media and the general public (Byrne, 1996). This is one of the areas where the effect of the “old 
boy network” is apparent since CEO compensation is determined by the board of directors which usually includes 
CEOs of other firms who are appointed by the CEO himself. 
 
Lack of Fit Stereotype 
 
There seems to be a lack of fit stereotype when it comes to female CEOs. This stems from the “think-
manager-think-male” paradigm. Females are stereotyped as being communal, as in having warm and soft traits 
(Kulich et al., 2011). These qualities, while positive in general, are not valued in a managerial context where agentic 
qualities, such as the ability to implement change and exert influence are more valuable (Kulich et al., 2011). 
Female CEOs are stereotyped as being less emotionally stable, less influential, less self-confident, less consistent, 
less analytical, and possessing poorer leadership traits than their male counterparts (Heilman and Haynes, 2005; 
Oakley, 2000; Eagly, Makhijani and Klonsky, 1992; Heilman et al., 1989). It is no surprise that female CEOs and 
top corporate managers strive to conform to male stereotype traits such as competence and the ability to influence 
(Schein, 2001; Offermann and Beil, 1992). The feminine leadership style includes soliciting input from others in 
order to create open lines of communication and make everyone feel included (Rosener, 1995; Powell, 1993; 
Helegesen, 1990). This willingness to share information and power could be a successful strategy for becoming a 
middle manager but not for advancing to the CEO position (Oakley, 2000). 
 
 However, once a female has overcome this lack of fit stereotype by holding a CEO position, this stereotype 
is diminished since the female CEO has proved that she can fit in and is an effective leader. This in turn makes it 
easier for a female with prior CEO experience to get hired as CEO again without having to deal with the lack of fit 
stereotype that first-time female CEOs have to struggle with. Hence, it would be helpful to compare female CEOs 
with prior CEO experience to female CEOs with no prior CEO experience. 
 
We organize the remainder of the paper as follows.  We start by reviewing past literature on CEOs with 
prior CEO experience.  Based on the literature review, we establish three testable hypotheses.  Then we discuss the 
sample and data followed by a discussion of our results.  Finally we conclude.   
 
BACKGROUND, MOTIVATION, AND DEVELOPMENT OF HYPOTHESES 
 
CEOs With Prior CEO Experience 
 
Hamori and Koyuncu (2014a, 2014b) point out an interesting new trend in CEO succession: Firms have 
been hiring CEOs with prior CEO experience. Prior to the 1990s, hiring CEOs with prior CEO experience 
represented less than 1% of new CEO hires (Karlsson and Neilson, 2009). This figure increased to about 5% 
between 1995 and 2002 and increased again to about 20% between 2007 and 2009 (Karlsson and Neilson, 2009). 
This dramatic increase in hiring CEOs with prior CEO experience may be due to the fact that firms are increasingly 
unwilling to take the risk of hiring individuals with no previous job-specific experience (Charan, 2005). Further, 
hiring firms assume that prior CEO experience provides both a good track record and an understanding of the CEO 
job (Khurana, 2001).  
 
Besides Hamori and Koyuncu (2014a, 2014b) there has not been extensive research conducted on CEOs 
with prior CEO experience. Elsaid, Wang and Davidson (2011) and Graffin, Boivie and Carpenter, (2013) have 
compared compensation, performance and stock market reaction for firms hiring CEOs with prior CEO experience 
to those hiring CEOs with no prior CEO experience. To the best of our knowledge, there has been no previous 
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research specifically comparing outgoing female CEOs with prior CEO experience to outgoing female CEOs with 
no prior CEO experience. 
 
Prior CEO Experience And CEO Compensation 
 
 The CEO position is an example of positions where individuals develop their managerial capabilities using 
the learning by doing phenomenon (Kotter, 1982). It also requires managing a combination of short-term, medium-
term and long-term responsibilities for the firm (Kotter, 1982).  Prior CEO experience helps form routines and 
decision-making shortcuts, i.e., “knowledge corridors” through which CEOs can understand and deal with the 
outside world (Rerup, 2005), which speeds up the decision-making process (Cormier and Hagman, 1987). 
 
Hiring a CEO with prior CEO experience will possibly reduce the risk associated with the succession. That 
is to say, firms have to pay an experience premium when hiring CEOs with prior CEO experience (Sturman, Walsh 
and Cheramie, 2008). The prior CEO experience increases the candidate’s competitive advantage (Castanias and 
Helfat, 1991) because it provides him/her a rare and valuable set of skills (Combs and Skill, 2003) and increases 
their human capital which should lead to higher pay in the labor market (Gerhart and Rynes, 2003). Thus, we 
hypothesize that: 
 
Hypothesis 1: Prior CEO experience is positively related to outgoing female CEO total compensation in the year 
preceding the succession. 
 
Prior CEO Experience And Firm Performance 
 
 CEO positions are radically different than other management positions because they require unique 
competencies such as managing the board of directors and the shareholders of the firm (McCall, 2004). The CEO 
position is unique in that it requires an understanding of different functional backgrounds such as, operations, sales, 
marketing, finance, accounting, and advertising, just to name a few. CEOs with prior CEO experience have 
performed a wide range of position-specific tasks and are likely to have obtained the competencies needed for this 
post (Hamori and Koyuncu, 2014a). CEOs with prior CEO experience usually will have a relatively shorter learning 
curve than their counterparts because they have transferable job-specific skills (Castanias and Helfat, 2001) that 
allow them to yield better performance for their firms. Previous research has suggested that job-specific skill and 
knowledge is a determinant of firm performance (Schmidt and Hunter, 1998). Thus, we hypothesize that: 
 
Hypothesis 2a: Prior CEO experience is positively related to firm performance (as measured by Industry Adjusted 
ROA) in the three years preceding the succession. 
 
Hypothesis 2b: Prior CEO experience is negatively related to the firm’s probability of bankruptcy (as measured by 
Altman’s Z Score) in the three years preceding the succession. 
 
Prior CEO Experience And Board Diversity 
 
The resource-based theory of competitive advantage (Barney, 1991; 1997; Grant 1991) can be used to 
understand the importance of ethnic and gender diversity on corporate boards. The resource-based theory proposes 
that firms have “bundles” of resources that lead to competitive advantages. The more unique and difficult to 
replicate these bundles of resources the stronger the firm’s competitive advantage (Shrader, Blackburn and Iles, 
1997). Human capital resources, such as ethnic and gender diversity, are considered to be sustainable resources that 
are among the most difficult to imitate and argued to be key to competitive advantage (Singh, Terjesen and 
Vinnicombe, 2008; Smith, Smith and Verner, 2006). Hillman, Cannella and Harris (2002) state that “… female and 
racial minority directors bring more resources than the additional perspectives and legitimacy provided by their 
gender and/or race. They bring a variety of occupational expertise and knowledge…..” As a result, we believe that 
CEOs with prior experience realize the importance of board diversity and strive during their tenure to increase the 
board diversity of the firms they lead. Thus, we hypothesize that: 
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Hypothesis 3: Prior CEO experience is positively related to the board of director diversity (as measured by the 
percentage of female and ethnic minority directors) in the two years preceding the succession. 
 
SAMPLE SELECTION AND DATA 
 
 Our sample consists of a hand-collected dataset of CEO successions between 1996 and 2013 (Elsaid, 2014). 
We form our sample by searching Standard and Poor’s Execucomp database for CEO successions where the 
predecessor CEO was a female and the successor CEO was male.  Execucomp contains data about top executives 
and their compensation for large, small and mid cap North American firms. The final sample consists of 46 CEO 
successions where the predecessor CEO was a female and the successor CEO was male (Elsaid, 2014).   
 
We obtain financial statement information from Compustat. We use the firms’ proxy statements to obtain 
data such as size of the board of directors, CEO age, CEO tenure, and whether the predecessor female CEO has prior 
CEO experience (Elsaid, 2014). We also use the proxy statements to get information on the composition of the 
board of directors.  For example, the number of female directors and the number of ethnic minority directors.  
 
To determine the type of succession, we examine the column “REASON” in the Execucomp database, 
which explains why the named CEO left the company (Elsaid, 2014). It provides four different reasons: resigned, 
retired, deceased, or unknown
3
. We verified the reason listed in Execucomp by searching the Wall Street Journal 
Index (WSJI) and the Wall Street Journal (WSJ) for the reasons for the succession. From the news stories, we 
classify voluntary successions as all CEO successions arising from retirement (CEOs over age 60)
4
, death, illness, or 
those involving the CEO’s departure for a better and more prestigious position in another firm. 
 
CEO Compensation Characteristics 
 
We examine the various components of compensation for the outgoing female CEO for the year preceding 
the succession, i.e., year −1. As a result, the compensation for the predecessor female CEO is measured in the fiscal 
year prior to the succession year. We ignore the transition year, i.e., year 0, since the transition year compensation 
data may include partial year compensation or compensation for those individuals holding positions other than CEO 
within the firm during the year. In addition, transition year compensation may include departure compensation for 
the predecessor CEO.  Total compensation includes salary, bonus, other annual compensation, restricted stock, stock 
options (valued using Black-Scholes), long-term incentive payout and all other compensation. Pay-at-risk 
compensation includes bonus, restricted stock and stock options. We adjust the compensation for inflation by using 
the Consumer Price Index. 
 
CEO Characteristics 
 
We determine whether the predecessor female CEO has prior CEO experience in another firm(s). We 
calculate predecessor CEO tenure as the difference between the year of the succession and the year in which the 
executive became CEO. We calculate the age of the predecessor CEOs as their age in the year of the succession 
announcement. We determine whether the successor CEO joined the company from the outside. We determine 
whether or not the predecessor CEO holds the title of CEO and chairman, CEO duality. CEO duality may 
concentrate power in the CEO’s position, allowing the CEO to potentially control information available to other 
board members, which may impede effective monitoring (Jensen, 1993). We create an indicator variable equal to 1 
if the CEO also holds the title of Chairman of the Board. 
 
  
                                                 
3 We did not have any observations were the reason for the succession was unknown. 
4 We consider the age 60 to be the normal retirement age for a CEO as in Parrino (1997).  
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Board Characteristics 
 
We use the firm’s proxy statements for year −2 and year -1 to determine the composition of the board of 
directors. We measure the percent of female directors on the board and the percent of ethnic minority directors
5
 on 
the board. We calculate these variables as the proportion of female directors and ethnic minority directors relative to 
total number of directors on the board. 
 
Firm Characteristics 
 
 We use the Compustat database to obtain data on the firm characteristics in year -1, -2 and -3. We then 
measure the industry-adjusted ROA (Barber and Lyon, 1996), Z score and firm size. Industry adjusted performance 
measures have been used to capture the relative performance evaluation (Blackwell, Brickley and Weisbach, 1994; 
Mehran, 1995). We define the ROA as net profits divided by the book value of assets and adjust it for the industry 
median using four-digit SIC codes and three-digit SIC codes when there are not at least three other firms in the same 
four-digit SIC code. Our proxy for firm size is the natural logarithm of the book value of assets. The Z score
6
 
measures the probability of bankruptcy, and we adopt the classic Altman (1968)’s definition to calculate it for each 
firm. Altman (1968) designed the Z score to forecast failure in the short term. 
 
RESULTS 
 
Table 1. Summary Statistics 
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics 
 N Mean Median Standard Deviation 
Outside Succession 46 0.48 0.00 0.51 
Forced Succession 46 0.46 0.00 0.50 
OCEO Tenure 46 5.49 4.96 3.89 
OCEO Age 46 53.04 52.00 5.45 
CEO prev. CEO experience 45 0.36 0.00 0.48 
OCEO Chair 46 0.50 0.50 0.51 
% Female Dir. t-1 36 0.24 0.22 0.13 
% Eth. Min. Dir. t-1 36 0.07 0.00 0.08 
% Female Dir. t-2 35 0.22 0.20 0.14 
% Eth. Min. Dir. t-2 35 0.08 0.09 0.09 
Size Adj. Salary t-1 39 93.90 89.63 38.68 
Size Adj. Total Comp. t-1 39 440.52 284.11 382.26 
Size Adj. Pay-at-Risk t-1 23 285.14 162.47 314.29 
Ind. Adj. ROA t-1 42 1.11 0.06 7.23 
Z Score t-1 39 3.88 3.31 3.17 
Ln TA t-1 42 7.04 6.75 1.95 
Ind. Adj. ROA t-2 43 0.70 -0.02 4.97 
Z Score t-2 41 5.54 4.61 5.61 
Ind. Adj. ROA t-3 43 0.86 -0.01 9.92 
Z Score t-3 41 11.73 5.25 27.76 
Ind. Adj. ROA t-1to-3 42 4.04 -0.01 24.04 
Z Score t-1to-3 41 7.01 4.61 9.87 
 
  
                                                 
5 Hillman, Cannella and Harris (2002) differentiated between White and African-American directors.  We determine ethnic minorities to be 
directors from any other ethnicity besides Caucasian.  
6 The original Z-score formula (Altman, 1968, 2000) was as follows:  
Z = 0.012 (WCAP/TA) + 0.014(RE/TA) + 0.033(EBIT/TA) + 0.006(MVE/BVL) + 0.999 (SALE/TA) 
where: (WCAP/TA) = Working Capital / Total Assets. This ratio measures liquid assets in relation to the size of the company. (RE/TA) = 
Retained Earnings / Total Assets. This ratio measures profitability that reflects the company’s earning power. (EBIT/TA) = Earnings Before 
Interest and Taxes / Total Assets. This ratio measures operating efficiency apart from tax and leveraging factors. It recognizes operating earnings 
as being important to long-term viability. (MVE/BVL) = Market Value of Equity / Book Value of Total Liabilities. This ratio adds market 
dimension that can show up security price fluctuation as a possible red flag. (SALE/TA) = Sales/ Total Assets. This ratio is a standard measure 
for sales turnover. 
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(Table 1 continued) 
Panel B: Successions by Year 
Year Freq. Percent 
1996 1 2.2 
1997 3 6.5 
1998 1 2.2 
1999 0 0.0 
2000 3 6.5 
2001 0 0.0 
2002 2 4.3 
2003 3 6.5 
2004 1 2.2 
2005 3 6.5 
2006 10 21.7 
2007 2 4.3 
2008 4 8.7 
2009 3 6.5 
2010 2 4.3 
2011 3 6.5 
2012 4 8.7 
2013 1 2.2 
Total 46 100.00 
 
Panel C: Successions by Fama and French (1997) 17 Industry Classification 
Fama-French (17) Industry Frequency Percent 
Food 1 2.2 
Mining and Minerals 1 2.2 
Oil and Petroleum Products 0 0.0 
Textiles, Apparel & Footware 2 4.3 
Consumer Durables 1 2.2 
Chemicals 0 0.0 
Drugs, Soap, Perfumes, Tobacco 4 8.7 
Construction and Construction Materials 1 2.2 
Steel Works Etc 2 4.3 
Fabricated Products 1 2.2 
Machinery and Business Equipment 4 8.7 
Automobiles 0 0.0 
Transportation 0 0.0 
Utilities 2 4.3 
Retail Stores 7 15.2 
Banks, Insurance Companies, & Other Fin. 4 8.7 
Other 16 34.8 
Total 46 100.00 
 
Table 1, includes the summary statistics for our sample. Panel A provides descriptive statistics. Panel B 
provides a breakdown of successions by year. Panel C provides a breakdown of the industries in our sample by the 
17 Fama and French (1997) industry classifications. In Panel C, we notice that 15.2% of our sample is retail stores 
where females are more likely to be hired as CEO in the case of an outside succession or advance to the CEO 
position in the case of an inside succession. We can consider retail to be what is referred to as a female friendly 
industry as compared to other industries such as oil and gas and till very recently the automotive industry
7
. 
 
  
                                                 
7 On January 15th, 2014 Mary Barra became the first female to hold the CEO position at a global automaker, General Motors. 
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Table 2. Prior CEO Experience and CEO Compensation 
 Size Adj. Total Comp. t-1 
(1) 
Size Adj. Salary t-1 
(2) 
Size Adj. Pay-at-Risk t-1 
(3) 
Constant 
291.255 
(0.477) 
-64.608 
(-1.060) 
550.349 
(0.636) 
CEO Previous CEO Experience 
216.087 
(1.726)* 
7.684 
(0.614) 
-23.042 
(-0.108) 
OCEO Age 
-1.790 
(-0.160) 
2.625 
(2.345)** 
-6.732 
(-0.408) 
OCEO Chair 
212.750 
(1.762)* 
-1.068 
(-0.089) 
164.116 
(0.957) 
OCEO Tenure 
31.687 
(1.723)* 
2.418 
(1.317) 
12.095 
(0.434) 
Outside Succession 
-192.972 
(-1.581) 
-1.341 
(-0.110) 
-121.344 
(-0.736) 
Forced Turnover 
24.799 
(0.189) 
18.368 
(1.402) 
-12.471 
(-0.068) 
Adjusted R2 17.8% 6.5% 2.7% 
(F) (2.336)* (1.432) (0.330) 
*p < 0.10; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01 
 
Our first hypothesis is that in the year preceding the succession, prior CEO experience is positively related 
to outgoing female CEO total compensation. We use an ordinary least squares regression model to test this 
hypothesis. In regression 1 of table 2, we can see that consistent with Hypothesis 1, outgoing female CEO total 
compensation (size adjusted) is significantly positively related to the prior CEO experience variable in the year 
preceding the succession, i.e., year -1. That is to say, female CEOs with prior CEO experience will get an experience 
premium in their compensation. We also see that the outgoing female CEO total compensation (size adjusted) is 
significantly positively related to the outgoing female CEO tenure and whether or not the outgoing female CEO held 
the Chair position at the time of the succession. In regressions 2 and 3 of table 2, we see that there is no significance 
between prior CEO experience and outgoing female CEO salary and pay-at-risk in the year preceding the 
succession. 
Table 3. Prior CEO Experience and Firm Performance 
 Ind. Adj. ROA t-1 
(1) 
Ind. Adj. ROA t-2 
(2) 
Ind. Adj. ROA t-3 
(3) 
Ind. Adj. ROA t-1to-3 
(4) 
Constant 
8.654 
(0.708) 
-2.044 
(-0.243) 
-29.375 
(-1.765)* 
-66.477 
(-1.280) 
CEO Previous CEO Experience 
4.761 
(1.925)* 
3.153 
(1.867)* 
3.330 
(1.947)* 
22.765 
(2.401)** 
OCEO Age 
-0.180 
(-0.804) 
0.019 
(0.125) 
0.627 
(2.042)** 
1.027 
(1.051) 
OCEO Chair 
-2.807 
(-1.189) 
-2.597 
(-1.606) 
-3.056 
(-0.946) 
9.529 
(1.220) 
OCEO Tenure 
-0.068 
(-0.197) 
0.263 
(1.108) 
0.167 
(0.354) 
0.120 
(0.099) 
Outside Succession 
1.549 
(0.634) 
2.884 
(1.720)* 
-5.277 
(-1.576) 
-9.970 
(-1.112) 
Forced Turnover 
2.792 
(1.055) 
-0.365 
(-0.201) 
1.315 
(0.366) 
18.476 
(1.994)* 
Adjusted R2 4.1% 3.1% 3.5% 25.1% 
(F) (1.283) (1.217) (1.248) (1.669) 
*p < 0.10; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01 
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Our second hypothesis is that in the three years preceding the succession, prior CEO experience is 
positively related to firm performance (H2a) and negatively related to firm’s probability of bankruptcy (H2b). We 
use an ordinary least squares regression model to test this hypothesis. In regressions 1 to 3 of table 3, we can see 
that, consistent with Hypothesis 2a, firm performance (as measured by Industry Adjusted ROA) is significantly 
positively related to the prior CEO experience variable in the three years preceding the succession, i.e., year -1, -2 
and -3. In regression 4 of table 3 we see that the average firm performance over the three year period preceding the 
succession is also significantly positively related to the prior CEO experience variable. 
 
Table 4. Prior CEO Experience and Firm Bankruptcy 
 Z Score t-1 Z Score t-2 Z Score t-3 Z Score t-1to-3 
Constant 
-1.797 
(-0.379) 
16.273 
(1.681) 
99.482 
(2.065)** 
2.411 
(0.132) 
CEO Previous CEO Experience 
-2.210 
(-2.308)** 
-1.895 
(-1.690)* 
-3.724 
(-2.425)* 
-5.959 
(-1.754)* 
OCEO Age 
0.120 
(1.358) 
-0.158 
(-0.876) 
-1.616 
(-1.799)* 
0.062 
(0.180) 
OCEO Chair 
1.310 
(1.414) 
-0.365 
(-0.193) 
-13.201 
(-1.403) 
-2.189 
(-0.753) 
OCEO Tenure 
0.062 
(0.441) 
-0.127 
(-0.436) 
0.842 
(0.582) 
0.032 
(0.066) 
Outside Succession 
-1.150 
(-1.207) 
-2.529 
(-1.289) 
-5.318 
(-0.545) 
-4.284 
(-1.284) 
Forced Turnover 
-0.975 
(-0.973) 
0.569 
(0.280) 
-4.351 
(-0.429) 
-0.911 
(-0.271) 
Adjusted R2 17.8% 22.6% 19.7% 14% 
(F) (2.336)* (2.020) (1.346) (1.301) 
*p < 0.10; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01 
 
In regressions 1 to 3 of table 4, we can see that, consistent with Hypothesis 2b, the firm’s probability of 
bankruptcy (as measured by Altman’s Z Score) is significantly negatively related to the prior CEO experience 
variable in the three years preceding the succession, i.e., year -1, -2 and -3. In regression 4 of table 4 we see that the 
average firm’s probability of bankruptcy over the three year period preceding the succession is also significantly 
negatively related to the prior CEO experience variable. 
 
Table 5: Prior CEO Experience and Board Diversity 
 % Female Dir. t-1 
(1) 
% Female Dir. t-2 
(2) 
% Eth. Min. Dir. t-1 
(3) 
% Eth. Min. Dir. t-2 
(4) 
Constant 
0.713 
(1.420) 
1.267 
(2.026)* 
0.301 
(1.338) 
0.243 
(0.652) 
CEO Previous CEO Experience 
0.060 
(3.026)** 
0.059 
(2.941)** 
0.043 
(1.937)* 
0.055 
(2.702)** 
OCEO Age 
-0.014 
(-1.389) 
-0.024 
(-1.853)* 
-0.005 
(-1.125) 
-0.002 
(-0.216) 
OCEO Chair 
0.017 
(0.235) 
0.001 
(0.013) 
0.027 
(0.730) 
0.038 
(0.611) 
OCEO Tenure 
-0.002 
(-0.214) 
0.002 
(0.163) 
-0.004 
(-0.745) 
0.008 
(0.922) 
Outside Succession 
0.166 
(1.964)* 
0.137 
(1.300) 
0.076 
(2.070)* 
-0.009 
(-0.141) 
Forced Turnover 
0.259 
(3.227)*** 
0.154 
(1.537) 
0.058 
(1.435) 
0.029 
(0.439) 
Adjusted R2 40.9% 34.8% 11.4% 13.5% 
(F) (2.125) (1.888) (1.224) (1.280) 
*p < 0.10; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01 
 
Our third hypothesis is that in the two years preceding the succession, i.e., year -1 and -2, prior CEO 
experience is positively related to the board of director diversity (as measured by the percentage of female and 
ethnic minority directors on the board). In regressions 1 to 4 of table 5, we can see that, consistent with Hypothesis 
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3, the percentage of female directors and percentage of ethnic minority directors is significantly positively related to 
the prior CEO experience variable. 
 
CONCLUSION AND DISCUSSION 
 
 In this paper, we investigate an interesting yet mostly ignored distinction between female CEOs with prior 
CEO experience and first time female CEOs. An implicit assumption underlying our paper is that there are 
significant differences between male and female CEOs and that the results of the paper would be significantly 
different from those obtained for CEOs in general. In making a choice to study the outgoing female CEOs, we built 
our study based on the data related to the years preceding the CEO succession. An underlying assumption for this 
choice is that the findings of our paper will be different from the findings of studies that consider the data related to 
the years after the appointment of female CEOs with or without prior CEO experience. Our reasoning for focusing 
on outgoing female CEOs is that we are attempting to capture their effect on the firms they led towards the end of 
their tenure. 
 
Consistent with Hypothesis 1, we find that prior CEO experience is positively related to the outgoing 
female CEO total compensation in the year preceding the succession. That is to say, experienced female CEOs enjoy 
the experience premium in their compensation until they leave the firm. Consistent with Hypothesis 2a, we find that 
prior CEO experience is positively related to firm performance (as measured by Industry Adjusted ROA) in the three 
years preceding the succession. Consistent with Hypothesis 2b, we find that prior CEO experience is negatively 
related to probability of firm bankruptcy (as measured by Altman’s Z score) in the three years preceding the 
succession. These results are an indication that the experience premium received by experienced female CEOs is 
well warranted. It could be argued that experienced female CEOs do a better job of running their firms than their 
first time female CEO counterparts. 
 
Consistent with Hypothesis 3, we find that prior CEO experience is positively related to board diversity (as 
measured by the percentage of female and ethnic minority directors) in the two years preceding the succession. The 
prior CEO experience helps the experienced female CEOs realize the importance of board diversity as it increases 
their firms’ competitive advantage. As a result, those experienced CEOs end up increasing the diversity of the 
boards of the firms they lead over their tenure. 
 
Implications 
 
Female CEOs have been an understudied group for one very simple reason: historically, there have not 
been many of them. That is the reason why our sample is somewhat small. The study examines the new and exciting 
issue of female CEOs with prior CEO experience. There are very few previous articles that examine the issue of 
CEOs with prior CEO experience (Hamori and Koyuncu, 2014a, 2014b; Graffin, Boivie and Carpenter, 2013; 
Elsaid, Wang and Davidson 2011). To the best of our knowledge, this is the first study to specifically address the 
issue of female CEOs with prior CEO experience. Firm management and board of directors should be aware that 
female CEOs with prior CEO experience do outperform their counterparts with no prior CEO experience. As a 
result, they do warrant higher compensation. 
 
Future Research 
 
An interesting area for future research is to examine industry differences in promoting females to the CEO 
position. That is to say, why are female CEOs more prevalent in certain industries? For example, we see a strong 
sector effect in our data with regard to the retail industry where we see a comparatively greater number of female 
CEOs. Another area for future research is to examine the effect of prior CEO experience in the years following the 
appointment of female CEOs. In addition, it would be interesting to examine whether or not female CEOs in 
industries where females are more prevalent than males are compensated less than female CEOs in industries where 
males are more prevalent than females. That is to say, is there a compensation gender-bias based on stereotyping of 
certain industries as women’s work (Major, 1994).  
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Limitations 
 
The study covers medium and large publicly traded U.S. firms. As a result, it does not include small and 
privately held firms. Any classification scheme that codes CEO successions as forced or voluntary is inherently 
subjective in nature. It is sometimes difficult to state with absolute certainty whether a CEO succession is forced or 
voluntary. The sample size
8
 is small due to the small number of female CEOs in general.  
 
AUTHOR INFORMATON 
 
Eahab Elsaid received his MBA and PhD from Southern Illinois University, Carbondale, USA. He is an Associate 
Professor of Finance at the Odette School of Business, University of Windsor, Canada. His research interests 
include: CEO compensation and succession; corporate governance; board demographics; CEO gender; and board 
structure. He has published in Gender in Management: An International Journal, Quarterly Review of Economics & 
Finance, Managerial Finance, and the Journal of Management and Governance.  
 
REFERNCES 
 
Adams, S., Gupta, M., & Leeth, J. (2009). Are female executives over-represented in precarious leadership 
positions? British Journal of Management, 20, 1–12.  
Aguilar, L. (2013). Merely cracking the glass ceiling is not enough. Luis A. Aguilar remarks at the Women’s 
Executive Circle of New York. Retrieved from http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/corpgov/2013/05/23/merely-
cracking-the-glass-ceiling-is-not-enough/  
Altman, E. (1968). Financial ratios, discriminant analysis and the prediction of corporate bankruptcy. The Journal of 
Finance, 23, 589-609. 
Altman, E. (2000). Predicting financial distress of companies. Retrieved from 
http://pages.stern.nyu.edu/~ealtman/Zscores.pdf  
Barber, B., & Lyon, J. (1996). Detecting abnormal operating performance: the empirical power and specification of 
test statistics. Journal of Financial Economics, 41, 359-399.  
Barney, J. (1991). Firm resources and sustained competitive advantage. Journal of Management, 17, 99-120.  
Barney, J. (1997). Gaining and sustaining competitive advantage. Reading, Massachusetts: Addison Wesley. 
Blackwell, D., Brickley, J., & Weisbach, M. (1994). Accounting information and internal performance evaluation: 
evidence from Texas banks. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 17, 331–358.  
Blau, F., & Kahn, L. (2000). Gender differences in pay. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 14, 75-99. 
Byrne, J. (1996). How high can CEO pay go? Business Week. Retrieved from 
http://www.businessweek.com/stories/1996-04-21/how-high-can-ceo-pay-go  
Castanias, R., & Helfat, C. (1991). Managerial resources and rents. Journal of Management, 17, 155-171.  
Castanias, R., & Helfat, C. (2001). The managerial rents model: theory and empirical analysis. Journal of 
Management, 27, 661-678.  
Catalyst (2006). 2005 Census of women board directors of the fortune 500. New York, NY: Catalyst. 
Charan, R. (2005). Ending the CEO succession crisis. Harvard Business Review, 83, 72-81. 
Combs, J., & Skill, M. (2003). Managerialist and human capital explanations for key executive pay premiums: a 
contingency perspective. Academy of Management Journal, 46, 63-73.  
Cormier, S., &  Hagman, J. (1987). Transfer of learning: Contemporary research and applications. San Diego: 
Academic Press. 
Eagly, A., Makhijani, M., & Klonsky, B. (1992). Gender and the evaluation of leaders: a meta analysis. 
Psychological Bulletin, 111, 3-22.  
Elsaid, E. (2014). Examining the effect of change in CEO gender, functional and educational background on firm 
performance and risk. Journal of Applied Business Research, 30, 1605-1614. 
Elsaid, E., Wang, X., & Davidson III, W. (2011). Does experience matter? CEO successions by former CEOs. 
Managerial Finance, 37, 915-939.  
Fama, E., & French, K. (1997). Industry costs of equity. Journal of Financial Economics, 43, 153-193.  
                                                 
8
 Including successions where the outgoing and incoming CEOs were both female would have only increased our 
sample size by 4 observations. 
The Journal of Applied Business Research – May/June 2015 Volume 31, Number 3 
Copyright by author(s); CC-BY 819 The Clute Institute 
Gerhart, B., & Rynes, S. (2003). Compensation: Theory, evidence, and strategic implications. London: Sage. 
Gordon, M. (1992). Discrimination at the top. Working Woman, 68–72. 
Graffin, S., Boivie, S., & Carpenter, M. (2013). Examining CEO succession and the role of heuristics in early-stage 
CEO evaluation. Strategic Management Journal, 34, 383-406.  
Grant, R. (1991). The resource-based theory of competitive advantage: implications for strategy formulation. 
California Management Review, 33, 114- 135. 
Hamori, M., & Koyuncu, B. (2014a). Experience matters? The impact of prior CEO experience on firm 
performance. Forthcoming in Human Resource Management. 
Hamori, M., & Koyuncu, B. (2014b). The CEO experience trap. Forthcoming in MIT Sloan Management Review. 
Haslam, S., & Ryan, M. (2008). The road to the glass cliff: differences in the perceived suitability of men and 
women for leadership positions in succeeding and failing organizations.  Leadership Quarterly, 19, 530 
546.  
Heilman, M., Block, C., Martell, R., & Simon, M. (1989). Has anything changed? Current characterizations of men, 
women, and managers. Journal of Applied Psychology, 74, 935-942 
Heilman, M., & Haynes, M. (2005). No credit where credit is due: attributional rationalization of women’s success 
in male-female teams. Journal of Applied Psychology, 90, 905-916.  
Helgesen, S. (1990). The Female advantage: Women’s ways of leadership. New York, NY: Doubleday. 
Hillman, A., Cannella, A., & Harris, I. (2002). Women and racial minorities in the boardroom: how do they differ? 
Journal of Management, 28, 747–63. 
Jensen, M. (1993). The modern industrial revolution, exit, and the failure of internal control systems. Journal of 
Finance, 48, 831–880. 
Karlsson, P., & Neilson, G. (2009). CEO succession 2008: stability in the storm. Strategy + Business, 55, 1-14. 
Khurana R. (2001). Finding the right CEO: why boards often make poor choices? MIT Sloan Management Review, 
43, 91-95. 
Kotter, J. (1982). The general managers. New York: Free Press. 
Kulich, C., Trojanowski, T., Ryan, M., Haslam, S., & Renneboog, L. (2011). Who gets the carrot and who gets the 
stick? Evidence of gender disparities in executive remuneration. Strategic Management Journal, 32, 301 
321.  
Major, B. (1994). From social inequality to personal entitlement: the role of social comparisons, legitimacy 
appraisals, and group membership. Advances in Experimental Social Psychology, 26, 293-355. 
McCall, J. (2004). Assessing American executive compensation: a cautionary tale for Europeans. Business Ethics: A 
European Review, 13, 243-254. 
Mehran, H. (1995). Executive compensation structure, ownership, and firm performance.  Journal of Financial 
Economics, 38, 163–184.    
Moore, D., & Buttner, E. (1997). Women entrepreneurs: Moving beyond the glass ceiling. Thousand Oaks, CA: 
Sage Publications. 
Oakley, J. (2000). Gender-based barriers to senior management positions: understanding the scarcity of female 
CEOs. Journal of Business Ethics, 27, 321-334. 
Offermann, L., & Beil, C. (1992). Achievement styles of women leaders and their peers: toward an understanding 
of women and leadership. Psychology of Women Quarterly, 16, 37–56.  
Parrino, R. (1997). CEO turnover and outside succession: a cross-sectional analysis. Journal of Financial 
Economics, 46, 165–197.  
Powell, G. (1993). Women and men in management. Newbury Park, CA: Sage. 
Rerup, C. (2005). Learning from past experience: footnotes on mindfulness and habitual entrepreneurship. 
Scandinavian Journal of Management, 21, 451-472.  
Roos, P., & Gatta, M. (1999). The gender gap in earnings. In G. Powell (Eds), Handbook of Gender and Work (pp. 
95–123). London: Sage. 
Rosener, J. (1995). America's competitive secret: Utilizing women as a management strategy. New York: Oxford 
University Press. 
Ryan, M., & Haslam, S. (2005). The glass cliff: implicit theories of leadership and gender and the precariousness of 
women’s leadership positions. In B. Schyns and J. R. Meindl (Eds), Implicit Leadership Theories: Essays 
and Explorations. Greenwich, CT: Information Age Publishing. 
Ryan, M., & Haslam, S. (2007). The glass cliff: exploring the dynamics surrounding the appointment of women to 
precarious leadership positions. Academy of Management Review, 32, 549-572.  
The Journal of Applied Business Research – May/June 2015 Volume 31, Number 3 
Copyright by author(s); CC-BY 820 The Clute Institute 
Ryan, M., & Haslam, S. (2009). Glass cliffs are not so easily scaled: on the precariousness of female CEOs’ 
positions. British Journal of Management, 20, 13–16.  
Schein, V. (2001). A global look at psychological barriers to women’s progress in management. Journal of Social 
Issues, 57, 675–688.  
Schmidt, F., & Hunter, J. (1998). The validity and utility of selection methods in personnel psychology: practical 
and theoretical implications of 85 years of research findings. Psychological Bulletin, 124, 262-274.  
Shrader, C., Blackburn, V., & Iles, P. (1997). Women in management and firm financial performance: an 
exploratory study. Journal of Managerial Issues, 9, 355–372.  
Singh, V., Terjesen, S., & Vinnicombe, S. (2008). Newly appointed directors in the boardroom: how do women and 
men differ? European Management Journal, 26, 48–58.  
Smith, N., Smith, V., & Verner, M. (2006). Do women in top management affect firm performance? A panel study 
of 2,500 Danish firms. International Journal of Productivity and Performance Management, 55, 569–593.  
Sturman, M., Walsh, K., & Cheramie, R. (2008). The value of human capital specificity versus transferability. 
Journal of Management, 34, 290-316.  
 
 
